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In social surveys, questions are often asked as to what subjects think people in various 
occupations actually earn and what they think these people should earn. Responses to 
these questions figure prominently in sociological studies on legitimacy of inequality and 
perceptions of justice. In the present study, responses to these questions are employed 
as well, but the major focus is on investigating the effects, if any, the way these questions 
are asked affects estimates of actual and just earnings provided by the subjects. More 
specifically, two hypotheses are proposed, the first of which concerns the association 
between actual and just earnings, as perceived by subjects, as a measure of legitimacy. It 
is argued that changing the order in which questions about the earnings are asked affects 
the strength of this association. A substantive justification for this hypothesis borrows from 
reward expectation theory and its concept of referential structures. The second hypothesis 
deals with between-subject agreement in the evaluations of just earnings and it proposes 
that the agreement may appear weaker or stronger depending on how the occupations 
to be evaluated by subjects have been selected. This hypothesis builds on expectations 
states theory, in particular, on status-processing principles in status-inconsistent situations.
Key words: actual and just earnings, do-earn and should-earn questions, reward 
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The present study investigates the effects that explicit variations in the form of 
a survey instrument used to elicit individual opinions towards income inequality 
have on these opinions. The instrument in question asks subjects what they think 
people in various occupations do earn and what they think these people should earn. 
Following the convention adopted by Osberg and Smeeding (2006), I will refer to 
the former as do-earn questions and to the latter – as should-earn questions. These 
questions were employed in a number of survey studies, including cross-national 
research projects, such as the International Social Survey Research Programme 
(ISSP; Klugel, Mason, and Wegener 1995) and the International Social Justice 
Project (ISJP; see Haller, Roger, and Smith 2009) responses to these questions 
were used in several analyses to study reactions to inequity in the distribution 
of income, legitimacy of income inequality (Gijsberts, 2002; Kelley and Evans 
1993; Kelley and Zagórski 2004), and social norms of just distribution of rewards 
(Arts, Hermkens, and Wijck 1995; Headey 1991; Osberg and Smeeding 2006; 
Słomczyński and Wesołowski 2001). A major premise of the present study is that 
responses to the do-earn and should-earn questions depend in a non-trivial way 
on how these questions are asked. My focus here is on (a) ordering of the two 
questions in the questionnaire and (b) set of the occupations whose earnings are 
evaluated by subjects. These features of a questionnaire were extensively studied 
in methodological studies on so-called ‘context effects’ (see Sudman, Bradburn, 
and Schwartz, 1996 for a review of those studies). However, my interest is not so 
much in whether or not the ordering of the two questions and the composition of 
the occupation set matter as in figuring out why they matter, if they do. I propose 
a substantive justification for these effects later on.
BACKGROUND
The Do-earn and Should-earn Questions
In a typical survey administration of the do-earn and should-earn questions, the 
interviewer reads out a list of occupational titles and for each title asks the subject 
what he or she thinks people working in the particular occupation actually earn. 
The titles are rather generic – such as ‘secretary in a private firm’ or ‘unskilled 
worker’ – and refer to fairly broad social-occupational categories that are 
differentiated along multiple dimensions, including salary and wages. Therefore, 
the subjects are asked to imagine a ‘typical’ or ‘average’ representative of the 
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occupation in question when trying to assess actual earnings for that occupation. 
Once the amounts of actual earnings are recorded for all the listed occupations, the 
interviewer proceeds to the should-earn question, and the procedure is pretty much 
the same, except now the subject is asked to indicate what he or she thinks people 
working in the occupations under study should be paid.
Several features of this design are of interest. First, the occupations whose 
earnings are evaluated by subjects are selected more or less arbitrarily from a set 
of all occupations. To be sure, the items in the do-earn and should-earn questions 
usually comprise well-paid and poorly paid jobs, jobs requiring advanced skills 
and simple jobs for which no particular jobs are needed, non-manual and manual 
jobs, jobs held in high and low esteem by the society, etc. In other words, the set 
of jobs to be assessed is deliberately made diverse in terms of earnings, skills, 
or prestige, but no criteria have been specified as to how the occupations are to 
be selected with respect to those characteristics and without explicit criteria the 
process of selection is more or less arbitrary.
Second, subjects estimate just earnings only after they have estimated the 
actual ones: the do-earn question is always asked first. For reasons given below, 
this has non-trivial implications for the study of justice of earnings and legitimacy 
of inequality.
Third, studies using the do-earn and should-earn questions are based on an 
implicit assumption according to which each subject has a ‘representation’ of 
a typical member of the occupations under study in terms of socially meaningful 
categories, such as those based on differences in formal education, skills, gender, 
age, and the like. In factorial surveys, which make use of ‘vignettes’ (Jasso 2006), 
this information is explicitly ‘manipulated’ by a researcher who provides the 
respondents with a series of descriptions of fictitious persons; these descriptions 
are in terms of gender, age, occupation, years of schooling, and earnings, or other 
characteristics of interest. Unfortunately, the do-earn and should-earn questions do 
not follow factorial surveys in this respect and also fail to make an effort to elicit 
the information on the individual representations of typical members of given 
occupations by other means. Hence, responses to the do-earn and should-earn 
questions allow only for limited analyses.
But even if they are only limited, these analyses can still provide important insights 
into popular beliefs about inequality and justice of earnings. For instance, comparison 
of average estimates by occupation can tell us which occupations are believed by 
the participants to be under- and which are believed to be over-rewarded. Further, 
comparison of the estimates in terms of inequality or dispersion can tell us whether 
or not the subjects perceive inequality in earnings to depart from an acceptable level 
and, if so, in which direction. Also, correlation between the estimates of actual and 
just earnings tells us how much agreement there is, in the subjects’ eyes, between 
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‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ (Osberg and Smeeding 2006). Finally, comparing 
the estimates for all pairs of subjects allows us to make inferences concerning the 
degree to which individual judgments agree with each other (Karpiński 2012).
Actual Earnings, Just Earnings, and Legitimacy of Inequality
A major focus of the present study is on the strength of association between 
individual perceptions of actual and just earnings, as it reflects how closely the 
actual distribution of income agrees with the just distribution, or the distribution 
that would be observed if everyone were paid what they deserved. In this ideal 
situation, everybody would receive what they ought to receive and, consequently, 
the actual distribution of income would be identical to the just distribution and the 
association between actual and just income would be equal to 1. In the ‘real world,’ 
however, some people are overpaid (i.e. they receive too much relative to what they 
deserve) and other people are underpaid (i.e. they earn too little relative to what 
they should earn), which results in less than perfect association between actual 
and just earnings. Thus, a less than perfect relationship between actual and just 
earnings corresponds to a departure of the income distribution from expectations 
of justice. In other words, if the association between actual and just earnings is 
less than 1, it is a reflection of injustice the subjects experience with respect to the 
income distribution (Osberg and Smeeding 2006). The further the strength of the 
association departs from 1, the more serious is the experience of injustice and the 
more likely it is to give rise to action aimed at restoring justice (Hegtvedt 1994; 
Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Because such action is indicative of the lack of 
legitimacy (Zelditch 2006; Zelditch and Walker 1984), the strength of association 
between actual and just earnings may be interpreted in terms of legitimacy of 
income inequality (Osberg and Smeeding 2006).
These ideas are presented graphically in Figure 1. In that graph, the horizontal 
axis, denoted A, represents the amount of actual earnings, while the vertical axis, 
denoted J, represents the amount of just earnings. The quantities jmin and jmax 
correspond to lower and upper bounds, respectively, on what people should be 
paid: no one ought to earn less than jmin or more than jmax. The two straight lines 
in Figure 1 can be thought of as reflecting two views on the actual distribution of 
earnings. The thick solid line represents the belief that the distribution is just, since 
actual earnings are (perceived to be) exactly the same as just earnings. In turn, the 
dashed line represents the view the actual distribution of earnings is not just, as 
some people (i.e. those who are close to the top of the hierarchy of earnings) earn 
too much relative to what they deserve, and so their earnings should be reduced, 
while others (i.e. those who are close to the bottom of the hierarchy) earn too little, 
and so their earnings should be increased. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between actual and just earnings
Source: Adapted from Osberg and Smeeding (2006) 
To put it in another way, the assumption behind the graph in Figure 1 is that the 
relationship between A and J is linear and has the functional form J = b0 + b1A. The 
belief that actual earnings are equal to the just ones satisfies b0 = 0 and b1 = 1, so that 
the relationship reduces to J = A. In turn, the belief that some earn too much, while 
others earn too little corresponds to b0 > 0 and 0 < b1 < 1. The further b 1 departs 
from 1 and the closer it gets to 0, the greater is the individual desire for reducing 
the actual differences in pay.
2.3 Referential Structures
Suppose a subject is asked to propose just amounts of income for two persons: 
a female physician with 10 years of job experience and a male nurse with 12 years 
of experience. The two persons differ explicitly in terms of gender, occupation, 
and job experience. Implicitly, they are also different with respect to education, 
as it takes more years of schooling to become a physician, and authority, with 
the physician being superordinate and the nurse – subordinate. If all these 
differences are salient in the given situation, they become bases of expectations 
for the subject as to what the two persons ought to be paid. Exactly how these 
differences translate into reward expectations is shaped by a set of commonly 
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held and socially validated beliefs linking levels of valued characteristics (such 
as those along which the hypothetical physician and nurse in the present example 
differ) with levels of rewards (such as earnings); these beliefs are called referential 
structures and their source is the culture of the collectivity to which the actors 
belong (Berger et al. 1985). In other words, referential structures can be thought 
of as ‘reference groups’ or ‘reference levels’ for determining just rewards in the 
immediate situation (Sutphin and Simpson 2009).
Three types of referential structures are distinguished (Berger et al. 1972): 
(a) categorical, (b) ability-based, and (c) outcome-based. The differences between 
the types of referential structures pertain to the type of attribute that is linked 
with reward levels. In the case of categorical referential structures, the attribute 
in question is membership in broad social categories, such as gender categories 
or ethnic ones. When a categorical referential structure is activated in a given 
situation, distribution of rewards in that situation invokes criteria of ‘who you 
are’ in determining rewards allocated to each actor. Thus, for instance, if men are 
generally believed to deserve more than women, the subject in the present example 
will propose a larger amount for the nurse.
In the case of ability-based referential structures, the attribute refers to 
a person’s ability to perform well on a task, or his or her ability to contribute 
to group’s goal. That is, an ability-based referential structure relates rewards to 
criteria of ‘what you can do’ and ‘what your skills are’ regarding the task at hand. 
To illustrate, if becoming a physician requires greater skills than becoming a nurse 
and if greater skills are believed to deserve greater rewards, then the subject in the 
present example will propose a larger amount for the physician. 
Finally, outcome-based referential structures link rewards to what one has 
actually accomplished or achieved.
As mentioned before, it is not possible to infer from responses to the do-earn 
and should-earn questions alone the criteria used by the subjects in assessing the 
actual and just amounts of earnings for the occupations under study. In other words, 
there is no way of knowing which attributes the subjects considered when making 
their judgments concerning just pay for incumbents of the various occupations. 
And since information about these attributes is not available, it is not possible for 
a researcher to establish which types of referential structures underlie subjective 
assessments of just earnings.
There is one exception, however, to this general statement. Recall from the 
earlier discussion that in a typical administration of the do-earn and should-earn 
questions, subjects are asked first to estimate the former. But this means that one 
basis of expectations of just rewards (earnings) is salient for the subjects, namely, 
actual earnings in the occupations under study, as perceived by the subjects. Actual 
earnings can be said to indicate levels of achievements and the subjects are likely 
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to base their estimates of just earnings for the occupations on the criteria of ‘what 
have you actually accomplished’ that are inherent in outcome-based referential 
structures, as explained above. In other words, asking the participants in the 
survey the do-earn question first introduces actual earnings as a salient referential 
structure for the task of evaluating just earnings in the occupations of interest. 
Because levels of rewards (just earnings) are ‘matched’ with accomplishments 
in this case, the relationship between individual assessments of actual and just 
earnings will be stronger under such circumstances than if the referential structure 
were not activated. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 If the do-earn question is asked first, subjects’ responses to this 
question activate an outcome-based referential structure. If the should-earn 
question is asked first, this particular referential structure is not activated and 
subjects cannot use it to ‘match’ levels of rewards to levels of achievements. Thus, 
the relationship between actual and just earnings will be stronger if the do-earn 
question is asked first than if the should-earn question is asked first. 
Status Consistency and Consensus in the Evaluation of Earnings
Suppose a subject is asked to propose just amounts of income for two persons: 
a male physician with 12 years of job experience and a female nurse with 10 years 
of experience. As in the previous example, the two persons differ along gender, 
occupation, and job experience, as well as (if implicitly) along education and 
authority. Unlike in the previous example, however, the former person is superior 
to the latter along all the salient dimensions of differentiation. In other words, as 
long as all the dimensions are status characteristics, relevant to the interaction 
between the two persons, status is allocated consistently in the present example, 
with the former person enjoying higher status than the latter with respect to all 
the characteristics (Balkwell et al. 1992; Berger et al. 1992). Because the former 
person has a higher status with respect to all the status characteristics, he comes to 
occupy a higher position in a resulting status hierarchy in the group, and if rewards 
(including income) are to be commensurate with status (Berger et al. 1985), the 
subject in the present example will likely believe that the former person deserves 
to earn more than the latter and, consequently, propose a higher amount of just 
income for the latter. If all participants in a survey were given the same task of 
evaluating just earnings for the two persons in the present example, there would 
likely be differences between the participants as to the exact amounts proposed 
for the two persons, but given the consistent status allocation, we can predict the 
subject to agree on who should earn more. Thus, status consistency is predicted to 
lead to consensus in the subjective evaluations of just earnings, at least in regard 
to who should be paid more.
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However, the answer to the question concerning relative positions of the persons 
in the status hierarchy of the group is not as straightforward when status is allocated 
inconsistently, so that one person has higher status than the other person along some 
status characteristics and lower status along others characteristics. According to the 
principle of organized subsets (Berger et al. 1972, 1985; see also Balkwell et al. 
1992; Berger et al. 1992), (a) actors use information on all status characteristics 
that are salient in the given situation and (b) one additional piece of information that 
is consistent with the previous information has smaller impact on actors’ behaviors 
than one piece of inconsistent information2. The principle of organized subsets 
proposes that reward expectations tend to be consensual under status inconsistency, 
too, provided that all actors are exposed to the same status-relevant information.
The difficulty in applying the principle to the data from surveys employing 
the do-earn and should-earn questions is that, as discussed above, it is unlikely 
that participants in such surveys base their evaluations of actual and just earnings 
on the same set of status distinctions. As a matter of fact, because participants in 
such surveys are only given names of the occupations whose earnings they are 
to evaluate, the researcher has literally no way of knowing which criteria these 
evaluations are based on. This may still be of little concern when the occupations 
in question differ consistently in terms of various characteristics, such as skills, job 
responsibility, or complexity. 
In order to see this, let us consider the following example. Suppose subjects 
in a survey are asked to propose just amounts of earnings for two occupations: 
physician and nurse. As mentioned above, we cannot know which characteristics 
of the two occupations the subjects consider when making their evaluations of just 
earnings. However, because a typical physician is superior to a typical nurse on 
most, if not all, status distinctions, the subjects are likely to agree with each other 
as to which of the occupations should be paid more. To illustrate, suppose subject 
A compares the occupations in terms of skills, while subject B compares them 
in terms of responsibility. Since becoming a physician requires more skills and 
entails greater responsibility, both subjects are likely to propose higher amounts of 
earnings for physician than for nurse. Thus, even though the subjects use different 
criteria – for that matter, even though the researcher does not know those criteria 
– when comparing the occupations, they will come to the same conclusion as to 
which occupation should earn more.
However, the differences between, say, physician and university professor are not 
so clearly pronounced. The latter occupation may require more skills than the former, 
but the former may entail more responsibility. If these beliefs are widespread in the 
population from which the subjects are recruited, and if subjects take into account 
different criteria when making their evaluations of just earnings for the occupations, 
then the resulting evaluations may not be in agreement as to which occupation should 
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be paid more. To illustrate, if, as in the previous example, subject A compares the 
occupations in terms of skills, while subject B – in terms of responsibility, A will 
rate university professor as having higher status, and therefore deserving greater pay, 
than physician, while B will attribute higher status to physician and consequently 
conclude that physician ought to earn more than professor. Thus, the two subjects 
will disagree as to which occupation should be paid more. 
These considerations lead us to the prediction that there will be more agreement, 
or consensus, in individual orderings of the occupations in terms of just pay if 
the status differences between the occupations are consistent than if they are 
inconsistent. However, for reasons given above, the degree of consistency in status 
differences between occupations cannot be varied explicitly. Therefore, a proxy 
measure of status consistency is used in the present study, namely, whether or 
not the occupations to be evaluated by subjects were ‘sampled’ from extremes 
of occupational hierarchy3. If status differences between two occupations are 
consistent, inequalities along each constituent status dimension add up resulting 
in a large difference between the two occupations in the resulting status hierarchy. 
In other words, if one occupation is ranked high along all constituent dimensions, 
while another occupation is ranked low, they are likely to end up at opposite ends 
of occupational status hierarchy. In turn, if status differences between occupations 
are not consistent, inequality in one status dimension may be reduced or balanced 
by reversed inequality in another dimension, leading to a relatively small distance 
between the occupations in the overall status hierarchy. Thus, we have arrived at 
our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 If status differences between occupations are large, more agreement 
is predicted between individual orderings of the occupations with respect to just 
pay than if the differences are not large. 
Anchoring and Justice Evaluations
When a subject is asked to propose just amounts of earnings for a set of occupations 
of interest, he or she is likely to face a degree of uncertainty in performing this 
task, as people do not necessarily have firm beliefs concerning just pay for various 
occupations, especially when the occupations are outside the scope of their 
daily experience or regular social interaction (Markovsky and Eriksson 2012). 
Judgments under uncertainty are susceptible to anchoring effects, an important 
class of cognitive heuristics, which consist in biasing the judgments towards or 
away from an anchor. An anchor provides background against which a decision 
is evaluated. Depending on the anchor, judgments made under otherwise identical 
conditions can be very different. Markovsky (1988) reported very potent anchoring 
effects in a series of experiments concerning just rewards and justice evaluations.
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Two types of anchoring effects are distinguished: assimilation and contrast. 
To illustrate, when the assimilation effect occurs, the estimates of just earnings 
tend to be higher in the presence of a high anchor than in the presence of a low 
anchor. In turn, when the contrast effect occurs, the estimates of just earnings tend 
to be lower in the presence of high anchor than in the presence of low anchor. 
Markovsky (1988) and Markovsky and Eriksson (2012) describe in considerable 
detail conditions for the occurrence of assimilation and contrast effects.
We offer a conjecture that participants in social surveys face uncertainty when 
they are asked both the do-earn and should-earn questions. Consequently, both 
types of judgment are hypothesized to be affected by the anchoring effects. In other 
words, it is hypothesized that respondents’ estimates of earnings in the various 
occupations are subject to ‘order effects’ (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwartz 1996), 
because the occupation whose earnings are estimated first provides a reference 
point to which earnings in the occupations rated subsequently are compared. If 
the first occupation to be rated is the same for all respondents, then the reference 
point will be similar as well. For instance, if the first occupation on the list is 
attorney and if subjects are aware that attorneys are paid well for their job, then the 
anchor is set rather high for most respondents and the beliefs about earnings in the 
remaining occupations are predicted to assimilate towards that anchor. 
If this conjecture is correct, one can expect responses to both the do-earn and 
should-earn question to be shifted towards the first response in the set and, overall, 
this shift will result in a positive correlation between the first response and the 
mean (or median) of the remaining responses. Further, if the degree of uncertainty 
faced by the subjects when answering the do-earn questions is the same as when 
answering the should-earn ones, the correlation is likely to be the same in both 
cases. This is our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 The first response in the set and the mean (or median) of the remaining 
responses will be positively correlated. The magnitude of this correlation will be 
the same for the responses to the do-earn and should-earn questions.
EXPERIMENT
The empirical basis of the findings reported in this paper comes from a study in 
which certain features of a questionnaire were explicitly manipulated in order to 
allow for a direct test of the hypotheses presented above. Subjects in the study were 
students of public and private schools in Warsaw who volunteered to participate 
in the experiment in exchange for money. The participants were divided into six-
person groups and there was one group per session. 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was seated at a table and 
received his or her own copy of the questionnaire. The participants completed 
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the questionnaires individually. The objective of the study was explained to 
them at the beginning of the session, although some specific details were not 
revealed until later. The subjects were also told that the study was not a test, so 
there were no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the questions in the questionnaire, 
and that the questionnaire was designed to learn their opinion on matters to 
which the questions referred and not to see if their knowledge as to these matters 
was accurate. Finally, the participants were assured that their answers were 
confidential.
The questionnaire was divided into four sections. The first one consisted of 
items asking subjects to rate six occupations in terms of (a) skills that are required 
to work in these occupations, (b) responsibility that is involved in working in 
them, (c) stress that people working in these occupations are exposed to, and (d) 
complexity of typical activities performed in these occupations. In each dimension, 
the occupations were rated on a seven-point scale. For instance, in order to evaluate 
skills required to work in the occupations of interest, subjects used numbers from 
1 to 7, with larger numbers indicating greater skills. 
The next section of the questionnaire contained items that asked subjects to 
provide their estimates of earnings in the occupations that they rated previously. 
More specifically, for each occupation, they were asked how much they thought 
people in these occupations actually earned as well as how much they thought 
these people ought to or deserve to earn for the earnings to be fair, or just. 
Items in the next section were adapted from ‘questionnaire experiments’ by 
Amiel and Cohen (1992, 1999). Each question in this section required participants 
to compare two fictitious income distributions in terms of inequality. These items 
were originally intended to test if popular perceptions of inequality followed 
axioms underlying the theory of inequality measurement (Cowell 2008, 2011). 
Finally, the last section of the questionnaire comprised items concerning the 
questionnaire and the study and subjects’ social and demographics characteristics.
Once all the participants in a particular session completed their questionnaires, 
they could ask some questions relating to the study and if they did, the experimenter 
went on to answer them as well as provided them with further details concerning 
the design and objective of the experiment that had not been presented to the 
participants at the beginning of the session. After that, the subjects were paid and 
the session ended.
Questionnaire
As mentioned, some features of the questionnaire were explicitly varied. It is 
precisely this information that was kept hidden from the participants until after 
they all completed the questionnaires. If that information was revealed to them at 
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the beginning of the session, they would most likely respond to that information, so 
that the data collected in the study would be difficult to interpret. In other words, if 
the information about the features of the questionnaire that were varied – as well as 
about the reasons they were varied – was made available to the participants at the 
beginning of the session, the results of the study could be attributed to its design or 
to subjects’ knowledge about hypotheses being tested. This is why it was decided 
to keep that information from the subjects until the end of the session.
Table 1 Median* estimates** by ESS5PL respondents of actual earnings and just earn-
ings in 17 occupations
Occupation Actual earnings Just earnings
farm worker 1,500 PLN 2,500 PLN
unskilled factory worker 1,500 PLN 2,000 PLN
departament store clerk 1,500 PLN 2,000 PLN
bricklayer 2,000 PLN 3,000 PLN
skilled factory worker 2,000 PLN 3,000 PLN
secretary 2,000 PLN 2,000 PLN
city bus driver 2,000 PLN 3,000 PLN
bank clerk 3,000 PLN 3,000 PLN
small shop owner 3,000 PLN 3,500 PLN
doctor in general practice 4,000 PLN 4,000 PLN
university professor 5,000 PLN 7,000 PLN
 chairman of a large enterprise 10,000 PLN 10,000 PLN
cabinet minister 10,000 PLN 8,000 PLN
attorney 10,000 PLN 6,000 PLN
Supreme Court judge 10,000 PLN 10,000 PLN
Member of Parliament 10,000 PLN 5,000 PLN
owner of a large factory 20,000 PLN 20,000 PLN
*Some respondents failed to provide their estimates for at least some of the occupations. Such missing cases 
were excluded from the analysis.
**NB: The estimates are given in Polish currency: Polski Nowy Złoty, or PLN. The exchange ratio of PLN to US 
dollar is approximately 3 to 1. 
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Occupations
The first feature of the questionnaire which was subject to experimental 
manipulation concerned the set of occupations rated by the study participants. 
Regardless of the questionnaire version, each subject rated six occupations. These 
occupations were randomly selected from a set of occupational titles used in the 
5th round of the Polish edition of European Social Survey (hereafter, ESS5PL). In 
ESS5PL, respondents were asked to estimate actual and just earnings in a total of 
17 occupations. In Table 1, median estimates are presented. The occupations were 
then divided into two groups. The first of them comprised those for which the 
median estimate of actual earnings is less than 10,000 PLN, and the second group 
– occupations for which the median estimate is at least 10,000 PLN. 
From the list of 17 occupations that were rated by participants in ESS5PL, two 
random ‘samples’ were then drawn, the first of which was a ‘stratified sample’ 
with 4 occupational titles selected from among the low-income occupations and 
2 – from among the high-income ones, while the second sample a simple random 
sample of low-income jobs. The resulting samples differ in terms of inequality in 
actual earnings: in the former sample the inequality is larger than in the latter one. 
The samples are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Occupations whose earnings were assessed in the present study
Sample A: Large inequality Sample B: Small inequality
attorney farm worker
chairman of a large enterprise bank clerk
city bus driver city bus driver
doctor in general practice doctor in general practice
bricklayer bricklayer
small shop owner small shop owner
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Ordering of the occupational titles in the questionnaire
The second feature of the questionnaire used in the present study, which was 
explicitly varied, is the ordering of the occupational titles in individual items. 
In social surveys, such as International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or 
International Social Justice Project (ISJP) the interviewer reads out the names of 
the occupational titles in a fixed order. It is conjectured that such ordering affects 
subjects’ responses and in order to test this conjecture the occupational titles were 
listed in either a fixed or random order in the questionnaire items. It is hypothesized 
that respondents’ estimates of earnings in the various occupations are subject to 
‘order effects’ (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwartz 1996). As a result, evaluations 
of earnings may appear more consistent than they really are, or – more precisely 
– a measure of the consistency of responses may reflect not only what people do 
think about earnings in the occupations, but also – the fact that the earnings are 
estimated in a fixed order.
Ordering of the questions
Finally, the third feature of the questionnaire that was manipulated is the order 
in which the actual and just earnings were estimated by the subjects. In previous 
studies, respondents first answered the do-earn question. The results of these 
studies are such that actual earnings are perceived to be, on average, higher than 
just earnings. Subjects’ evaluations of the latter earnings may then be somewhat 
‘distorted’ by their assessments of the former earnings, due to the anchoring effect. 
Thus, in order to be able to verify the validity of this conjecture the ordering of 
this question in the questionnaire was varied, so that some respondents rated just 
earnings first, while others – rated actual earnings first.
Table 3 Summary information about the sample
Mean Variance
Gender (1=female, 0=male) 0.76 0.18
Age (in years) 22.48 3.18
Originally from Warsaw? (1=yes, 0=no) 0.29 0.21
Graduate student? (1=yes, 0=no) 0.28 0.20
Thus, the present study can be said to use a 2 (large vs. small inequality) × 2 (fixed vs. random ordering of 
the occupations) × 2 (actual earnings first vs. just earnings first) between-subject design. Hence, there are 
eight distinct experimental conditions, or eight different versions of the questionnaire. There were 15 subjects 
per condition, with total sample size equal to 120. In Table 3, some summary information about the sample 
is given. 
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RESULTS
Testing Hypothesis 1
Analytical procedure
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we will employ a linear model of the following 
form: 
ln(jgh) = β0 + β1 ln(agh) + β2 sgh + β3 rgh + β4 pgh + β5 cgh + εgh (1)
where 
• jgh denotes evaluation of just earnings in occupation h by subject g, 
• agh denotes evaluation of actual earnings in occupation h by subject g, 
•  sgh denotes a measure of evaluation by subject g of the level of skills required 
to work in occupation h, 
•  rgh denotes a measure of evaluation by subject g of responsibility involved in 
working in occupation h, 
•  pgh denotes a measure of evaluation by subject g of stress that those working 
in occupation h are exposed to, 
•  cgh denotes a measure of evaluation by subject g of complexity of typical 
activities performed by members of occupation h and 
• the εgh are residuals while the β are simply regression coefficients.
Several observations concerning features of model (1) are in order. First, note that 
it uses logarithmic transformations of subjective evaluations of actual and just 
earnings. It uses the logarithmic transformations, because, as shown in Figure 2, 
distributions of the evaluations of earnings are heavily skewed. However, the 
transformation affects the relationship between just and actual earnings, as it 
amounts to assuming that the relationship between the original variables is 
multiplicative rather than linear. 
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Figure 2 Distributions of responses to the do-earn and should-earn questions
Second, the other independent variables in (1) – that is, those that refer to 
subjective evaluations of the occupations in terms of skills, responsibility, stress, 
and complexity – are also transformations of the original responses. The rationale 
behind this transformation is that the evaluations of just earnings seem to depend 
non-linearly on the perceptions of occupations with respect to skills, responsibility, 
stress, and complexity. This is shown in Figure 3. In order to ‘correct for’ this non-
linearity, the following formula was used (see Jasso 2001 for details):
 (2)
In that formula,  denotes a measure of ‘standing’ of occupation g along dimension 
w according to subject h, while  means a relative rank of that occupation. The 
relative ranks were calculated for each subject, and each dimension of evaluation, 
separately, by first ranking the evaluations and dividing the raw ranks by m+1, 
with m being the number of occupations. 
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Figure 3 Mean subjective evaluations of just earnings in various dimensions
Third, using the double subscripts for variables in (1) is intended to emphasize 
a hierarchical, or multilevel, nature of the data, with a lower level being constituted 
by the occupations, or by how the subjects perceive them, and a higher level – by 
the subjects, or by the conditions (i.e. versions of the questionnaire) to which the 
subjects were assigned. Fourth, because of the multilevel nature of the data, there 
are assumed to be two sources of variation in the dependent variable: (a) within-
subject variation, or departures of natural logarithms of individual estimates of 
just earnings provided by a particular subject from the mean for that subject, and 
(b) between-subject variation, or departures of the means for particular subjects 
from the grand mean. Because of the between-subject variation, estimates of the 
regression coefficients in (1) are expected to take on different values for different 
subjects. As a first step in modeling the between-subject variation, let us consider 
the following claims concerning the values of the coefficients: 
β00 = γ00 + u0h (3a)
β1 = γ10 (3b)
β2 = γ20 (3c)
β3 = γ30 (3d)
β4 = γ40 (3e)
β5 = γ50 (3f)
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In (3a) γ00 stands for the grand mean, or the mean value of the dependent variable 
aggregated across all the subjects. That is, because there were 120 participants in 
the study and because each participant provided his or her own evaluation of just 
earnings in 6 occupations, we obtained 720 subjective evaluations of just earnings 
and the grand mean is obtained by averaging all the 720 observations (or their 
natural logarithms, to be precise). In turn, the term u0h in (3a) indicates how much the 
mean value of the log of subjective perception of just earnings for subject h departs 
from the grand mean. As for the remaining four predictors in (1), the estimates of 
the regression coefficients for these variables are claimed to be constant across all 
subjects. After appropriate substitutions and manipulations we arrive at: 
ln(jgh) = γ00 + γ10 ln(agh) + γ20 sgh + γ30 rgh + γ40 pgh + γ50 cgh + u0h + εgh  (4)
In (4), the last two terms are random effects, with u0h being the between-group 
residuals and εgh the within-subject residuals. The remaining terms in (4) constitute 
what are called fixed effects. The fixed effects are interpreted as regression 
coefficients, with the intercept γ00 indicating the mean value of the dependent 
variable when all independent variables are set to 0 and the slopes indicating the 
amount of change in the value of the dependent variable that is associated with 
a unit change in the value of a particular predictor when all the other predictors are 
kept constant. The random effects are assumed to be independently and normally 
distributed with mean 0 and constant variance. 
Comparison of model (4) with (1) allows us to test if the between-subject 
variation in the value of the intercept is significant. 
As a next step, we will consider a model that makes the following claims: 
β00 = γ00 + u0h (5a)
β1 = γ10 + u1h (5b)
β2 = γ20 (5c)
β3 = γ30 (5d)
β4 = γ40 (5e)
β5 = γ50 (5f)
Formula (5a) is interpreted in the same manner as (3a). As regards equation (5b), γ10 
denotes the mean value of the regression coefficient for the log of actual earnings, 
or the expected change in the dependent variable associated with a unit change in 
the log of subjective assessment of actual earnings, all else being equal. The term 
u1h in that equation indicates how much the estimate of the regression coefficient 
for subject h departs from the mean value. Making appropriate substitutions gives: 
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ln(jgh) = γ00 + γ10 ln(agh) + γ20 sgh + γ30 rgh + γ40 pgh + γ50 cgh + u0h + u1h ln(agh) + εgh (6)
Again, the terms in (6) are interpreted in much the same way as in (4), with the 
last three terms being the random effects and the remaining terms being the fixed 
effects. Comparison of model (6) with (4) allows us to test if the slope of the log 
of subjective assessment of actual earnings varies significantly across subjects. 
Finally, once the significance of the between-subject differences has been 
established, we can attempt to model the differences using the characteristics of 
the study participants, in particular, which version of the questionnaire they were 
assigned to. This results in an extension of the model in (6) satisfying the following 
conditions: 
β00 = γ00 + γ01Ih + γ02Oh + u0h (7a)
β1 = γ10 + γ11Oh +u1h (7b)
β2 = γ20 (7c)
β3 = γ30 (7d)
β4 = γ40 (7e)
β5 = γ50 (7f)
In (7a) Ih denotes the large-inequality condition, or a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if subject h was assigned to the large-inequality condition and 0 otherwise, 
and Oh means the ordering of the do-earn and should-earn questions in the 
questionnaire, or a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if subject h was 
asked the do-earn question first and 0 otherwise. Making appropriate substitutions 
and manipulations gives 
ln(jgh) = γ00 + γ01Ih + γ02Oh + γ10 ln(agh) + γ11ln(agh)Oh + γ20 sgh +  
γ30 rgh + γ40 pgh + γ50 cgh + u0h + u1h ln(agh) + εgh (8)
Adding the variables Ih and Oh to the model changes the interpretation of its 
parameters. The reference group comprises the subjects that were assigned to the 
small-inequality condition and given the should-earn question before the do-earn 
question. The intercept γ00 denotes the mean value of the dependent variable when 
all the predictors are to 0 in the reference group. The coefficient γ01 indicates how 
much, on average, the intercept in the large-inequality condition departs from 
the intercept in the reference category, all else being equal. The coefficient γ02 
indicates how much, on average, the intercept in the subsample that was asked the 
do-earn question first, differs from the intercept in the reference category, when 
all else is kept fixed. However, it is the coefficient γ11 that is most important for 
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testing Hypothesis 1, as it refers to the difference between the reference category 
and the subsample that was given the do-earn question first in terms of the effect 
of (the log of) actual earnings: if γˆ11 > 0, then the association between (subjective 
assessments of) actual and just earnings is greater when the do-earn question is 
asked first, as predicted by Hypothesis 1.
The analyses reported in the following sections were all carried out using the 
R environment (R Development Core Team 2012), in particular the functions for 
estimating multilevel models available in the package nlme (Pinheiro et al. 2013).
Results of the test
In Table 4, the results of fitting models (1), (4), (6), and (8) to the data from the 
present experiment are presented. All the models were fit using restricted maximum 
likelihood (REML) estimation. The first three models are identical in terms of the 
fixed effects, but there are differences between them as to the random effects they 
contain. Let us begin by pitting model (4), the random-intercept model, against (1), 
the baseline model, in which no random effects are included. As mentioned earlier, 
comparison of the two models in regard to how well they fit the data is intended 
to see if there is indeed significant between-subject variation in the value of the 
intercept. If there is, then it makes sense to use mixed-effects linear regression 
to model the source of the variation. But if the between-subject differences with 
respect to the value of the intercept are not significant, the mixed-effects models 
are unnecessary.
In order to test for the significance of the between-subject variation, we 
use likelihood ratio (LR) test. The test statistic, G2, is the negative of twice the 
difference between the likelihoods of the two models and is asymptotically chi-
square distributed. Because the random-intercept model has one parameter more to 
estimate than the baseline model — namely, the variance of the term u0h — the LR 
statistic is based on a single degree of freedom. The null hypothesis states that the 
intercept does not vary substantially across subjects, so there is no point in applying 
the mixed-effects models. Using the figures in Table 4 yields G2=117.2 with df=1. 
A difference in log likelihoods as large as this is very unlikely if the null hypothesis 
is correct, because, given a single degree of freedom,  Hence, 
we can conclude that the random-intercept model fits the data significantly better 
than the model without a random intercept.
The significance of the variation in the slope associated with the log of 
subjective evaluation of actual earnings is established in much the same way. 
Again, the null hypothesis claims that there is no variation in the steepness of the 
slope. The test statistic is asymptotically chi-square distributed and equal to the 
negative of twice the difference between the log likelihood the random intercept 
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Table 4 Results of fitting the models to the data
Fixed effects (1) (4) (6) (8)
Intercept 3.06 3.813 4.141 4.53
(0.149) (0.149) (0.209) (0.265)
0.618 0.516 0.471 0.407
(0.02) (0.02) (0.028) (0.035)
sgh 0.031 0.074 0.062 0.073
(0.035) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
rgh 0.083 0.056 0.061 0.052
(0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
pgh 0.01 0.035 0.028 0.035
(0.03) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
cgh 0.09 0.119 0.158 0.16
(0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Ih 0.198
(0.035)
Oh -0.733
(0.364)
0.096
(0.047)
Random effects
0.039 1.966 1.823
0.034 0.031
-0.992 -0.994
0.069 0.051 0.051
Fit statistics
Log likelihood -220.826 -162.242 -109.078 -99.269
AIC 455.652 340.485 238.155 224.537
BIC 487.639 377.04 283.85 283.886
N 719 719 719 719
***p<0.01; **p<0.05 *p<0.1
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model and log likelihood of the random slope model. The test statistic G2 is now 
based on two degrees of freedom, however, because the random-slope model has 
two more parameters to estimate in comparison with the random-intercept model, 
the first one being variance of the term u1h and the second — covariance of the 
termsu0h andu1h. Using appropriate data from Table 4, we have G
2=106.3 based on 
df=2, which is significant far beyond the conventional level of p=0.05. Hence, the 
variation in the slope of ln(agh) is highly significant.
Figure 4 Graphical presentation of the effect of perceived actual earnings on pre-
dicted just earnings in different experimental conditions
Once we have established that there is indeed substantial variation across 
subjects with respect to the values of the intercept and the slope associated 
with the log of subjective evaluation of actual earnings, let us go on to examine 
whether or not that variation can be successfully modelled using the attributes of 
the subjects, i.e. the conditions they randomly assigned to. The rightmost column 
of Table 4 contains relevant figures. It is important to recognise, however, that 
the interpretation of the regression coefficients is somewhat complex, because the 
estimates reported in Table 4 pertain to the effects of transformations of the original 
variables and translating the magnitudes of these effects back to the original metric 
requires caution. Let us begin by discussing the effects of the subjective perception 
of actual earnings. As we can see, the estimate of the slope associated with this 
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variable is equal to 0.407. The meaning of this figure is that of two occupations 
compared by a particular subject which differ in terms of perceived actual earnings 
by one unit on a logarithmic scale, but are otherwise identical, the expected log 
of just earnings is greater by 0.407 for the occupation whose actual earnings are 
perceived to be greater. In other words, the expected difference in the log of just 
earnings of these two occupations is 0.407, which is equivalent to saying that the 
expected ratio of just earnings is equal to e0.407 = 1.502 for the two occupations and 
for the subjects in question. In still other words, increasing the log of perceived 
actual earnings by one unit adds 0.407 units to the expected log of just earnings, or 
multiplies the expected just earnings by a factor 1.502.
Note, however, that this result holds only for those subjects who were asked 
the should-earn question first. In the subsample that was asked the do-earn 
question first, the effect of the log of perceived actual earnings is estimated to be 
0.407+0.096=0.503. Thus, if two occupations compared by a particular subject 
are identical in all respects except for perceived actual earnings, where they differ 
by one unit on the log scale, the one that is perceived to actually earn more is 
also believed to deserve 0.503 units more on the log scale. In line with the above 
interpretation, increasing the log of perceived actual earnings by one unit translates 
into adding 0.503 to the expected log of deserved earnings or multiplying the 
expected deserved earnings by a factor 1.654. Thus, the difference between asking 
the do-earn question first and asking the should-earn question first amounts to the 
difference between 1.654 and 1.502 in the rate at which expected proposed just 
earnings increase. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
That the slope associated with (the log of) perceived actual earnings is 
significantly steeper in the subsample that was given the do-earn question first 
is consistent with Hypothesis 1 above. Hence, the hypothesis can be said to be 
supported by our data.
Testing Hypothesis 2
Analytical procedure
The second hypothesis predicts that the subjective perceptions of just earnings 
agree to a greater extent in the large-inequality condition that in the small-inequality 
condition. We say that the amounts of just earnings proposed by two subjects are 
in agreement when the ordering of the occupations in terms of the amounts is the 
same in both cases. We say that they are in disagreement when ordering of the 
occupations with respect to just earnings proposed by one subject is the reverse of 
the ordering with respect to earnings proposed by the other subject. Between the 
extremes of complete disagreement and complete agreement there is a continuum 
of intermediate situations.
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For a particular pair of subjects, the agreement is measured by correlating the 
amounts of just earnings they provided. We use Kendall’s τ, a rank correlation 
coefficient, to measure the agreement. Kendall’s τ is bounded between −1 and 1, 
the former corresponding to the case of perfect disagreement, the latter – to the 
case of perfect agreement. By averaging the values of τ over all pairs of subjects 
in a group, we obtain a measure of agreement for that group (Balkwell, Bates, and 
Garbino 1980; Karpiński 2012).
Table 5 Mean perceived differences between the occupations by condition
Earnings Skills Responsibility Stress Complexity
Small inequality 811.75 1.54 1.64 1.45 1.56
Large inequality 6158.10 1.76 1.56 1.75 2.01
Difference 5346.35 0.22 −0.08 0.29 0.46
p value 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00
Recall, however, that, according to Hypothesis 2, the expectation of more 
agreement in the large-inequality condition than in the small-inequality condition 
requires that differences between the occupations being rated be greater in the 
former than in the latter. That is, even if evaluations of just earnings are in greater 
agreement in the former condition than in the latter, one cannot reasonably 
conclude that Hypothesis 2 is supported unless one has established that perceived 
differences between the occupations are indeed greater in that condition than in 
the other one. Therefore, before going on to compare measures of agreement in 
the two conditions, we will compare the groups in terms of perceived differences 
between the occupations.
In order to quantitatively express how different the occupations are in the 
eyes of the subjects with respect to actual earnings, skills, responsibility, stress, 
and complexity, we use standard deviations of their subjective evaluations of the 
occupations in these dimensions. That is, for each participant in the study we 
compute standard deviation of his or her evaluations of the occupations in each of 
the five dimensions. In turn, the two inequality conditions are compared in terms 
of how different on average the occupations are perceived to be by subjects in 
these conditions along each dimension. Table 5 shows the results.
For each dimension of interest, Table 5 reports (a) the mean standard deviation 
in the small-inequality condition, (b) the mean standard deviation in the large 
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inequality condition, (c) the difference in the means, and (d) p value for one-
tailed t test for the significance of the difference. As it turns out, subjects in the 
large-inequality condition perceive the differences between the occupations 
to be significantly greater than subjects in the small-inequality condition in all 
dimensions except for responsibility. The exception may be due to a somewhat 
confusing nature of the concept of responsibility, as some subjects complained 
during the post-experimental session, pointing out that it may refer to responsibility 
for others’ well-being (in which case doctor, bricklayer, bus driver, and farm 
worker score high in this dimension, as their mistakes are potentially dangerous 
for people’s health) or responsibility for employees (in which case CEO and shop 
owner bear more responsibility than others), etc. Apart from this one exception, 
however, the results in Table 5 are consistent with expectations.
Given that perceived differences between the occupations are greater in the 
large-inequality condition, we can conclude that the antecedent condition in 
Hypothesis 2 is met and proceed to a direct test of that hypothesis, that is, to 
the comparison of average levels of agreement in the two inequality conditions 
using the procedure outlined earlier on. In each inequality condition, there were 60 
subjects, which gives a total of 1,770 pairs per condition. For each pair, the value 
of Kendall’s τ was computed, as a measure of agreement between the amounts 
of just earnings proposed by the subjects in that pair. The average value of τ in 
the large-inequality condition equals 0.656 and in the small-inequality condition 
it equals 0.411. The difference between the means is statistically significant at 
p=0.05 (t=27.3, df=3538). This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Thus, we 
can conclude that the hypothesis is supported by our data.
Testing Hypothesis 3
In order to test Hypothesis 3, the following quantities were obtained for each subject: 
1. estimate of actual earnings in the first occupation evaluated by a subject, 
2.  mean estimate of actual earnings in the remaining five occupations evaluated 
by the subject.
These two variables were then correlated, using Kendall’s τ. An analogous 
procedure was then applied to the responses to the should-earn questions. 
Results of the analyses are presented in Table 3, where the relevant correlations 
and corresponding p values are shown. The p values refer to significance of the 
correlation, as determined by one-sided t test with df=58. We used one-sided test, 
because Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive correlation between the anchor and the 
responses. The number of degrees of freedom in the test reflects the fact that the 
subsample was further divided according to whether the occupations were printed 
in the questionnaire in the fixed order.
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Table 6 Correlations between ‘anchors’ and ‘responses’ in responses to the do-earn 
and should-earn questions
Just earnings Actual earnings
Occupation in fixed order? Correlation p value Correlation p value
Yes 0.580 0.000 0.474 0.000
No 0.605 0.003 0.616 0.005
As we can see, the correlations in Table 6 are positive, which is in line with 
Hypothesis 3. Further, the magnitudes for the responses to the do-earn questions 
are close to the magnitudes for the should-earn questions, which also agrees 
with the hypothesis, although one should note that the difference between the 
correlations is slightly greater in the case of the subjects for whom the occupations 
were printed in the fixed order. Thus, the proposition that subjects face uncertainty 
when they make judgments concerning both actual and just earnings is supported 
by our data.
However, it is important to remember that the evidence for anchoring effects 
in the present study is rather weak. The anchoring effects observed by Markovsky 
(1988) and Markovsky and Eriksson (2012) were powerful, because they found 
positive correlations between subjective estimates of just rewards and randomly 
determined levels of actual rewards. In the present study, the actual rewards 
(earnings) were not randomly assigned to occupations or manipulated by the 
researcher. However, if the subjects held firm beliefs concerning actual and just 
earnings in the occupations under study, one may suspect that the correlations 
between the first response and the mean of the remaining responses would be 
much smaller. Further studies on the anchoring effects in the responses to the do-
earn and should-earn questions are clearly needed in order to investigate more 
fully conditions under which these responses are affected by anchoring effects. 
Recall that subjects in the present study were students, some of whom worked part 
time or were looking for a job. Perhaps they had confident views about actual pay, 
but only in regard to those jobs they were interested in and were they asked about 
actual earnings in these jobs, their responses would be less susceptible to anchoring 
biases. More generally, people may hold more or less firm beliefs about earnings 
in the occupations they are familiar with and for these jobs their responses to the 
do-earn and should-earn questions are less likely to be affected by anchors. This 
conjecture is worth looking into in future studies.
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CONCLUSION
There are several implications the present experiment suggests as regards future 
studies using the do-earn and should-earn questions. The first one concerns the 
set of occupations whose earnings are evaluated by subjects. Depending on the 
composition of this set, the degree of agreement between subjective assessments 
of just earnings may appear to be relatively large or relatively small. Because 
the degree of agreement is a measure of normative consensus as to who should 
get how much for their work, this is a discouraging result, since it suggests that 
some non-random fluctuation is implicated in the measure that is a side-effect of 
the study design and has little to do with the phenomenon being studied. This 
feature may be rather difficult to overcome unless future studies make more 
informed choices as to the selection of the occupations to be included in the 
do-earn and should-earn questions. This would require a high-quality database 
with information on status characteristics of the occupations. A good place to 
start might be a recent classification of occupations, as developed by Domański, 
Sawiński, and Słomczyński (2009), and accompanying occupational scales which 
measure standing of the occupations with respect to skills, complexity, or material 
remuneration. One can therefore take into account the differences with respect to 
the characteristics when sampling the occupational titles to be included in the do-
earn and should-earn questions. This way, the degree of status consistency in the 
sampled occupation can be explicitly controlled by the researcher. 
Second, results presented in this paper give support to the hypothesis that 
ordering of the do-earn and should-earn question matters, as it affects which 
referential structures are salient for the participants in the study. Asking the do-
earn question first activates an outcome-based referential structure, which links 
reward levels with what one has accomplished, given that actual earnings are 
a measure of accomplishment. If an outcome-based referential structure is made 
salient in the given situation, those who have accomplished more are believed 
to deserve more than those with little accomplishment. In other words, reward 
levels are matched with levels of achievement in this situation, contributing, in 
the context of the do-earn and should-earn studies, to the strength of association 
between actual and just earnings. Changing the order of the questions changes the 
referential belief that is salient to the subjects when making judgments concerning 
just pay for the occupations in question. That is, criteria in terms of which the 
amounts of just earnings for the occupations are decided are different when the 
should-earn question is asked first, the implication being that much caution is 
needed when designing a questionnaire containing the do-earn and should-earn 
questions to make sure that only the desired referential structures are activated by 
the research design.
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The study also replicates results from earlier experiments (Markovsky 1988) 
showing that estimates of just rewards are subject to anchoring effects, although it 
has to be emphasized that the evidence for anchoring in the present study is rather 
weak. As mentioned above, the previous experiments explicitly manipulated the 
amounts of actual earnings that were salient to the subjects, whereas in the present 
study the actual earnings were estimated by the subjects themselves. However, 
the present study suggests that the estimates of actual earnings are affected by 
anchoring bias in much the same way as the estimates of just earnings. This is an 
interesting finding and further research might aim at working out the conditions 
affecting the degree of uncertainty that subjects face when they make both types 
of judgments. 
NOTES
1  Detailed information on ISSP and ISJP, including their methodologies, questionnaires, 
sampling designs, and the like, can be found on their respective websites: www.issp.org 
and www.butler.edu/isjp/. 
2  The principle of organized subsets, as a model of how information on status distinctions 
between actors is processed, was tested against a number of competing theoretical 
arguments. These alternative principles of processing status information, even though 
they differ in details, agree that social actors tend to ignore some information on status 
distinctions that are salient in the immediate situation. For instance, one of the alternative 
principles claims that actors take into account only those pieces of information that are 
beneficial to them and ignore those pieces that are not. Still another principle claims that 
actors focus on the largest subset of status distinctions that are consistent. Experimental 
tests (Balkwell et al. 1992; Berger et al. 1992) showed that the principle of organized 
subsets fares better as a predictor of behavior.
4 For a related argument, consult Balkwell, Bates, and Garbino (1980, 1981, 1982).
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